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Summary
Border and transportation security is a pivotal function in protecting the
American people from terrorists and their instruments of destruction.  This report
uses a series of graphical presentations to form one possible framework that might
assist policy makers in understanding the complex nature of border and transportation
security.  It is the first in a  three-part series of CRS reports that make use of
analytical frameworks to better understand complex problems in border and
transportation security and cast them in terms that facilitate the consideration of
alternative policies and practices. (CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation
Security:  Selected Programs and Policies, the second report in the series discusses
selected programs and policies currently in place to address these issues.  The third
and final report in the series is CRS Report RL32841, Border and Transportation
Security:  Possible New Directions and Policy Options.)
Border and transportation security is an important component of the overall
homeland security effort.  This effort can be seen as a series of concentric circles or
screens, with the outer screen being that of preventative efforts launched outside the
country-for example, interdicting or arresting terrorists and their weapons abroad
before they reach the United States.  The next screen is interdiction in the border and
transportation security system.  This series of screens then moves through
progressively smaller circles ending with emergency preparedness and response.
Congressional concern over homeland security began with broadly defined efforts to
learn more about the nature of the terrorist threat, and then moved to much more
specific actions following the attacks on September 11, 2001.  Congressional interest
continues, however, in broader, more strategic approaches.
The search for border and transportation security is a complex task.  For
example, internationally shipped cargoes travel in various conveyances on a variety
of infrastructures, through a number of places, are held in the custody of numerous
people and organizations, and can involve up to 40 separate documents to complete
the journey from the source zone to the distribution zone.  This report suggests  that
if the border can be envisioned not merely as a physical boundary but rather as a
flexible concept that allows for the possibility that the border begins at the point
where goods or people commence their U.S.-bound journey, a significantly wider
array of options for border management policies becomes available.  
What follows are a series of graphical presentations intended to assist policy
makers in visualizing the flow of people and goods across the borders that, when
combined with a discussion of current border policies (discussed in the second report
in this series), may be useful in seeking new directions for more effective border
management policies (discussed in the third and final report in the series).  This
report will not be updated.
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Border and Transportation Security:  
The Complexity of the Challenge
Introduction
There is consensus that Border and Transportation Security (BTS)  is a pivotal
function in protecting the American people from terrorists and their instruments of
destruction.  The adequate provision of BTS is an extremely complex endeavor given
the scope of U.S. borders, and the volume of traffic flowing across them.  As
described by Admiral James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS):
We must secure nearly 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico,
across which more than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, and 2.5
million rail cars pass every year.  We also patrol almost 95,000 miles of shoreline
and navigable waters, and 361 ports that see 8,000 foreign flag vessels, 9 million
containers of cargo, and nearly 200 million cruise and ferry passengers every
year.  We have some 422 primary airports and another 124 commercial service
airports that see 30,000 flights and 1.8 million passengers every day.  There are
approximately 110,000 miles of highway and 220,000 miles of rail track that cut
across our nation, and 590,000 bridges dotting America’s biggest cities and
smallest towns.  That is just a thumbnail of the vast infrastructure that supports
the largest and most efficient economy in the world — with more than $11
trillion in Gross Domestic Product.1
This report utilizes several graphical presentations to better understand the
points of vulnerability in the BTS system, before discussing one, integrated approach.
It should be noted that the approach in this report is but one of a number of possible
approaches to this issue.  This report is the first in a three-part series of CRS reports
that make use of analytical frameworks to better understand complex problems in
BTS and cast them in terms that facilitate the consideration of alternative policies and
practices.  (CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation Security:  Selected
Programs and Policies, the second report in the series discusses selected programs
and policies currently in place to address these issues.  The third and final report in
the series addresses possible approaches and policy options that might be explored
by Congress in searching for higher levels of BTS, and is entitled CRS Report
RL32841, Border and Transportation Security:  Possible New Directions and Policy
Options.)
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Definition of Border Security and the Scope of the Report
In this report (and the other two reports in the series), “BTS” is taken to mean
all efforts by the U.S. government and other actors to interdict terrorists and their
weapons of destruction at the U.S. “border” and in the nations’s transportation
system.  Initially, it starts with direct intervention to prevent threats and interdict
dangerous people and goods at the U.S. border itself (in terms of ports of entry at
land, sea or air terminals).  Protection efforts at the border are extended to encompass
both such extra-border activities as targeting and pre-inspection of people and cargo
in originating ports around the world, cross-border efforts between ports of entry by
the Border Patrol, as well as intra-U.S. efforts to intercept people and goods as they
are shipped inland from their original port of arrival (or from internal U.S. sites).
The latter involves using the internal enforcement tools of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other law
enforcement agents.
While the report treats the BTS role in preventing and interdicting other threats
that may occur inside the United States, it only does so as it relates to the
transportation sector as a means of delivering the terrorist or threat or as a target
itself.  This report does not address domestic intelligence or law enforcement efforts
directed at terrorists inside the country in depth, although the second report in the
series does discuss aspects of intelligence and enforcement related to immigration
and border policy.  Finally, this report focuses almost exclusively on what comes in
via the border, and not so much on what goes out (except the effort to prevent
terrorists and their activities from being transshipped to our allies abroad).  The
report employs several policy frameworks for arraying complex phenomena to help
in both understanding and analyzing the myriad activities that are embraced in the
search for greater BTS. 
Functions of a Conceptual Framework
 
Conceptual frameworks can be important aids to achieving greater
understanding of underlying problems, as well as framing more effective solutions.
Criteria for a good policy framework include:
! Does it help the analyst or policymaker understand and provide
structure to a complex phenomenon?
! Does it help focus on important dimensions of policy design?
! Does it help generate additional hypotheses for possible future
action?
! Does it offer guidance for prioritizing actions?
With these criteria in mind, we now turn to a discussion how BTS fits into the larger
concept of homeland security.
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The Role of Border and Transportation Security 
in Homeland Security
The homeland security effort can be seen as a series of concentric circles or
screens, with the outer screen being that of preventive efforts launched outside the
country.  The continuum of activities to provide homeland security then moves
through progressively smaller circles starting from more distant efforts to closer and
more localized measures.  Thus, the process starts with prevention abroad and
progresses through the other stages as needed:
(1)  Discovery and Interdiction of Terrorist Action Emanating
from Abroad 
The earlier that terrorists and/or their weapons are known and interdicted (even
before coming to the United States), the lower the danger to the country and its
people.  With so many targets of opportunity in such a large and open society, it is
virtually impossible to protect them all.  Hence, the importance of enhanced
intelligence to learn the identities of terrorist groups and individuals, as well as their
motives, planned actions, targets, weapons, and timing.  This effort (and any follow-
on interdiction abroad) could be further enhanced with the use of effective diplomacy
in marshaling the support and cooperation of other countries, even to the point of
using joint police and/or military force to contain the danger abroad before terrorist
missions are launched on U.S. soil.  This is stage one, the first screen in terms of
reach and importance for success in the rest of the mission to prevent attacks and
damage to people and property.  It includes related policy efforts to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in an attempt to deny terrorist access
to the most devastating weapons.  If this first stage is overlooked, the screening at the
border could lack focus and be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of dangerous
travelers and materials.
(2) Interdiction at the Border and in the Transportation Sector
If terrorists and weapons of mass destruction cannot be quarantined abroad, then
it is up to the second screen of BTS efforts to interdict bad people and/or bad things
at the border.  If they get past the border, then they must be picked off at other access
points as they are transported into the interior of the country.  Once again, given the
inherent vulnerability of nearly 300 million people living in a free and open society,
and millions of physical targets of opportunity in the nation’s infrastructure, it is
paramount that this interception phase be as effective as possible.  The lion’s share
of resources in the new DHS is indeed focused on this target with approximately 60%
of the budget (and over 85% of the Department’s manpower) committed to this goal.
Key actors in this effort are the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
including the Border Patrol (BP); the Coast Guard (CG); and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).
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(3) Defending Against Catastrophic Terrorism Inside the
United States 
This stage has many dimensions.  In part, it is designed as a reminder to policy
analysts that BTS efforts extend beyond actions at the border.  There are domestic
intelligence and law enforcement capabilities that can be exploited if terrorists get
past the border and outside the reach of other transportation security efforts.  These
include domestic intelligence components of the FBI, ICE, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), as well as the law enforcement
capabilities of these agencies and their state and local counterparts — which are
combined in roughly 100 localized Joint Terrorist Tracking Task Forces (JTTFs). 
(4) Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Populations 
If the three previous screens were penetrated, there would be little standing in
the way of attack on vulnerable populations or infrastructures.  It is possible to
“harden” these targets to some extent, but there are so many targets and terrorists are
so opportunistic that this phase of the screen can offer little more than tight control
at critical sites, and a very thin net over the rest.  Special targeted measures can be
taken to protect clear targets such as nuclear power and chemical plants, as well as
other power plants, oil refineries, etc.  The government can encourage the
development of sensors and other warning devices to alert and provide some measure
of protection to the population against certain forms of chemical or biological
weapons.  Finally, citizens can be informed and advised about protective actions they
might take. 
(5) Emergency Preparedness and Response   
If all else fails, we must be prepared to (1) minimize the damage and loss of life
from an attack, (2) alleviate the effects of injury and destruction, and (3) continue to
operate effectively as a society in re-building efforts.  While this phase would occur
at the end of the process, it is receiving increased policy attention because the other
forms of protection can never be perfect or complete.  Thus, while funding is greatest
for BTS (and for the military in its operations related to terrorism), we cannot
overlook the preparedness and response stage of protection because of the irreducible
level of vulnerability that will always remain.  In an atmosphere of risk and
uncertainty, prudent investors will seek to diversify their portfolios — in this case,
to build overlapping layers of protection.
With this framework as context, the report narrows its focus to BTS.
The Goals of Border Security 
(Re-Conceptualizing the Border)
This section of the report aims to provide an understanding of border security
— redefined later in this report as “good border management.”  To further this
understanding, this section offers several graphical presentations of border security.
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2 This single comprehensive framework is but one possible framework that could be
formulated; other studies have offered other typologies.  For example, regarding cargo and
supply chain security see, Henry H. Willis and David S. Ortiz, Evaluating the Security of
the Global Containerized Supply Chain (RAND Corporation, 2004).
At the end of the report, we synthesize these concepts into a single, more
comprehensive framework.2
Trends in Thinking About the Concept of “Borders”
Border research has become multi-disciplinary in focus. Political scientists,
geographers, sociologists,  economists, and a variety of others have contributed much
to research and have offered a variety of constructs and avenues of approach to the
notion of borders.  Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States, the thinking often focused on several trends that challenged the prevailing
concept of borders strictly defined by the boundaries of the nation-state including (1)
geopolitical watersheds such as the end of the Cold War, or the launch of the
Schengen Treaty in Europe; (2) increasing economic integration in the global
economy; (3) increasing integration of border towns and so-called ‘border regions’;
and (4) the developing boundary-less virtual societal space created through the
Internet.  These challenges all seemed to be leading towards a world where borders
became evermore permeable to all sorts of things (people, goods, ideas, identities),
inexorably tied to the changing place of the nation-state, and perhaps becoming
increasingly irrelevant.  In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, these ideas are being
reevaluated, particularly in the United States where, as seen above,  border security
(or good border management) forms an integral part of the national strategy for
providing homeland security.
In broad terms, good border management seeks to balance the competing (but
not necessarily conflicting) goals of (1) facilitating (and even expediting) access for
people and goods that are both needed and desired; with (2) interdicting and stopping
‘bad’ people and ‘bad’ things from entering the country.  The key to success in this
endeavor is the ability to accurately and efficiently identify high-risk passengers and
cargo, target them for inspection, and prevent the entry of dangerous goods and
people without impeding the flow of legitimate cross-border traffic.  The task for the
policy maker is to identify and promote those policies which will enhance the
efficacy of the filters employed for these tasks.
More specifically, the border enforcement agent or inspector is ultimately
engaged in an identification and verification process.  It is an effort to determine the
identity of the people or cargo requesting entry, and to verify the legitimacy of the
request for entry.  There are many debates about how best to do this.  The current
entry processing procedures for both people and cargo are complex, and involve
numerous steps each of which presents both an opportunity for interference or for
interception.  Identifying the first step in this process is a challenging endeavor, for
reasons that will become ever clearer throughout the course of this series of reports.
In the case of cargo, is the first step when the goods first leave the factory where they
were produced?  Or is the first step when the goods are placed on the conveyance
(ship, aircraft, traincar, truck) that will ultimately deliver them to the United States?
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3 The concepts of primary and secondary inspection can further complicate the discussion.
As would be expected, a primary inspection consists of some set of standard examination
protocols that are applied to every shipment of cargo or person seeking entry into the
country.  It follows then that the secondary inspection is a further set of protocols applied
to those shipments or people, which for a variety of possible reasons were unable to be
satisfactorily processed during the primary inspection.
4 Recently, some have called for 100% screening or inspection of air cargo, see, for example,
Caitlin Harrington, “Unchecked Boxes:  Markey Pushes for Screening of All Air Cargo,”
CQ Homeland Security — Border Security, Oct. 18, 2004; others have called for
international shipping standards to require shippers and terminals to develop a system to
screen 100% of  containers worldwide.  See Caitlin Harrington, “New Maritime Cargo
Security Programs Vulnerable to Terrorists, Flynn Says,” CQ Homeland Security — Border
Security, Oct. 14, 2004.
5 Remarks of Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner, Sept. 12, 2004,
at the Customs World London Summit, accessed at [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
(continued...)
In the case of people, is the first step when the individual applies for a passport from
their own country?  Or is the first step when they apply for a visa to enter the United
States?
The ‘last’ step in this process is easier to pinpoint as it is the inspection at the
port of entry.  One of the vexing questions confronting policy makers is what actually
constitutes an inspection?  Does a review of entry documents alone constitute an
inspection?  Or does something physical have to occur, for example taking
fingerprints, or taking an x-ray of a container?  Does the inspection mean that the
inspector must physically open up and look inside every container to verify its
contents?  Compounding the problem is the seeming interchangeability of the terms
‘inspection’ and ‘screening.’  Typically, the term ‘inspection’ is used to denote some
level of examination of a person or a good, and as noted above can entail a number
of different actions.3  The term ‘screening’ generally is used when referring to
applying a filter or a ‘screen’ to information or characteristics of cargo and people
seeking entry.  The screen is typically designed to match either certain known criteria
with information about the entering cargo or person; or to flag certain patterns,
characteristics, or indicators, as high risk attached to the entering cargo or person.
Does calling for 100% inspection of cargo containers mean the same thing as calling
for 100% screening of goods and people?  The level of inspection or screening (in
whatever context these terms are used) is likely to remain a significant part of the
border security debate for the foreseeable future.4  Clear definitions of terms are
essential to clarifying these issues.
In sum, what does good border management look like?  Recent experience has
illustrated with remarkable clarity what it should not look like.  In the immediate
aftermath of September 11, 2001, the borders of the United States were essentially
shut down. All air traffic into the United States was either cancelled or diverted
(including both commercial passengers and cargo).  The U.S. Customs Service went
to its highest state of alert.  On the land border, this meant that every vehicle entering
the United States from Canada and Mexico was searched, causing delays of up to 16




6 Stephen Flynn, “The False Conundrum:  Continental Integration versus Homeland
Security,” in Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., Rebordering North America
(New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 115.
7 See CRS Report RL32840, Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and
Policies, by Lisa M. Seghetti, Jennifer E. Lake, and William H. Robinson.
in significant economic losses, in particular to those industries, such as the auto
industry, that rely on just-in-time shipping to keep their production lines running.  By
September 13, DaimlerChrysler reportedly announced the closure of one of its
manufacturing plants on the following day; and on September 14, Ford announced
that it would have to close five plants during the ensuing week.6
What follows are a series of conceptualizations to assist the policy maker in
developing a redefined understanding of the border that includes good border
management.
Developing a Possible Typology for 
the Policy Maker
Border management is an extremely complex task.  As the second report in the
part series will illustrate,7 even the current U.S. border management regime with its
bevy of institutions, policies, and programs can seem overwhelmingly complex and
difficult to approach in a systematic way.
Seemingly simple notions such as what is the border; where is it; and  when
should we be concerned about it are not as straight forward as they appear on the
surface.  The first two questions, the what and the where of the border, are related
and somewhat interdependent.  For example, if the what of the border is simply the
physical geographic boundary and limited to U.S. ports of entry, then the where and
the when are self explanatory:  people or goods enter the United States when they
have physically crossed the territorial boundary, and they need not be addressed until
they reach the border.  This approach to border control might work in a situation
where the flow of cross-border traffic was small, and the resources available to
process this traffic were plentiful.  However, the current environment for securing
U.S. borders is far more complicated, as noted above in the Introduction with the
statement of Admiral James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of the DHS.
If the border is envisioned not merely as a physical boundary but rather as a
flexible concept that allows for the possibility that the border begins at the point
where goods or people commence their U.S.-bound journey, a significantly wider
array of  options for border management policies becomes available.  What follows
are a series of conceptualizations intended to assist in answering the above questions
and when combined with a discussion of current border policies, may be useful in
seeking new directions for more effective border management policies.  It is
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S o u r c e  Z o n e
T r a n s it  Z o n e
D e s ti n a t io n  Z o n e
D P O EF P O E
T r a n s it  Z o n e
T ra n s i t  P o r t
Figure 1. Geographic Zones
important to note that this series of conceptualizations is cumulative, in the sense that
each one builds off of the concepts illustrated in the previous section.
Geographic  
This approach illustrates the path that goods or people travel to enter the United
States.  The path is divided into zones:  source zone (country of origin); departure
zone (foreign port of entry/exit (FPOE)); the transit zone (between country of origin
and the destination country); the arrival or approach zone (domestic port of entry
(DPOE)); and the destination zone (interior of the destination country).  Figure 1
should be viewed left to right, and illustrates the zones that people or goods travel
through from country of origin to country of destination.  Figure 1 is designed to
accommodate a variety of travel situations.  In the case shown, travelers and cargo
proceed through another country or countries en route to the United States, including
the case where travelers and cargo stop in intermediate countries, or ports through
which cargo is transhipped.  However, direct travel from source country to
destination can also be visualized by mentally eliminating the transit zones and port
from the figure.
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Note:  FPOE = foreign port of exit, and DPOE = domestic port of entry.
With land-based modes of transportation, there is no transit zone between the
country of origin and destination country.
Movement of Goods and Cross-Border Movement of People
— Three Principal Flows  
Another way of envisioning the border is offered by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD presented a
conceptualization (specifically dealing with the shipment of vessel-borne containers)
which may prove useful.  The OECD’s approach identifies three principal flows in
the international movement of goods:
! the movement of goods from place to place (logistics chain);
! the movement of custody from person to person; and
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Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, Directorate for Science, Technology, and
Industry, July 2003, pp. 23-28.
! the movement of information or documents.8
The principal point to take away from these illustrations is that in order to secure
cargo shipments from terrorists (or criminals for that matter) it is necessary to secure
a wide range of potential targets — including people, places, conveyances, and pieces
of information.  Internationally shipped cargoes travel in various conveyances on a
variety of infrastructures, through a number of places, are held in the custody of
numerous people and organizations, and can involve up to 40 separate documents to
complete the journey from the source zone to the distribution zone.  Figures 2-4, and
the accompanying text illustrate this complex process.
Movement of Goods from Place to Place (Places in the Logistics
Chain).  On its journey from the country of origin to the destination country, cargo
moves through the hands of numerous actors in a variety of places.  Figure 2
illustrates the case of cargo being transported between countries in maritime
containers.  Cargo begins its journey in the source zone, at the factory.  From the
factory, the cargo may travel by truck, rail, or air, to reach the FPOE (departure zone)
in the country of origin.  During this leg of the journey, the cargo may be warehoused
for export at a later date; it may stop at a consolidation center where it may be
combined with other cargoes to comprise a full-container’s (truckload’s, railcar’s)
worth of shipments; and it may be transferred from one mode of transportation to
another (from rail to truck for example) before reaching the port of exit.  Once at the
port (departure zone), the cargo is transferred to the ocean-going vessel that will take
it across the transit zone.  The cargo may pass through another port in the transit zone
before reaching the final port of entry in the destination country.  From the port of
entry in the destination country (DPOE) (arrival zone), the cargo may travel to the
distribution zone by truck or by rail to be (1) warehoused for distribution at a later
date; or (2) de-consolidated and perhaps re-consolidated for transport to the buyer.
A variety of actors are involved in each of these places in the logistics chain,
possessing ‘custody’ of the cargo on its journey.
Source: CRS analysis of OECD figures in Security in Maritime Transport.




















Source Zone Destination ZoneTransit Zone
Figure 2.  Cargo — Movement of Goods From Place to Place
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9 CRS Site Visit, Detroit-Windsor Dec.  2003.
10 For more information on drayage, see CRS Report RL31738, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation: the Future of Commercial Trucking Across the
Mexican Border, by Robert S. Kirk and John F. Frittelli.
However, the movement of maritime containers is likely the most complex case.
Air cargo shipments move in a similar manner, though the time it takes for a
shipment to travel from the source to the destination zone is typically measured in
hours rather than the days and even weeks for maritime shipments.  Air cargo
shipments can move by more than one mode of transportation to a consolidator or
directly to an airport; shipments may be consolidated with others into air cargo
containers (which are smaller than sea containers and configured to maximize storage
space in the cargo holds of aircraft); cargo may pass through a transit airport on its
way to the destination airport; once at the destination airport the air cargo may be
transported offsite to a consolidated freight station and de-consolidated, transferred
to a truck or a rail car and moved to the final destination.
In contrast to shipments moving by sea or by air, the time it takes land-border
shipments to travel from the source to destination zone can be measured in hours, if
not minutes.  One facet of the land border environment has been the advent of highly
integrated ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) shipping.  JIT is particularly prominent in the
automotive industry where for example on the northern border:  seats for General
Motors (GM) cars arrive at the GM plant in Detroit, MI less than an hour after being
assembled and sent across the Peace Bridge in Windsor, Ontario, Canada.9  In other
cases, where smaller or less frequent shipments are required, they travel from the
factory to a consolidator who consolidates less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments into
a complete container, and transports them across the border.  Another unique facet
of truck transport prevalent along the southern border is the process of ‘drayage’
where short-haul trucks ferry cargo back and forth across the border.10  This adds
another transfer phase to the process where drayage is used, as an extra carrier is
involved.
For shipments crossing the border by rail,  the flow is also similar, in that the
factory shipments may be placed directly into railcars (as is the case with some auto
plants for example) or they may transported by truck to a consolidator or to an
intermodal rail facility where shipments (complete or consolidated) are placed in
railcars for shipment across the border.
Movement of Custody from Person to Person (Actors in the
Logistics Chain).  Each cargo shipment begins with a buyer and an originating
shipper, typically the manufacturer.  Intermediaries such as buying agents and freight
forwarders are the most frequently utilized intermediaries between the originating
shipper and the ocean carrier.  Freight forwarders can provide multiple services
needed to transport cargo from factory to port:  transport; warehousing;
consolidation; etc.  However, other actors can provide these services individually as
well.  These include customs brokers, truck and rail carriers, warehouse agents,
consolidators, etc.  Thus, cargo shipments can be held by a number of different actors
on the journey to the port of exit (in the case of Figure 3, the FPOE).  Once at the
port, the cargoes pass through the control of the customs authority and are transferred
CRS-11
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Figure 3. Cargo — Movement of Custody from Person to Person
to the port operator, who then transfers them to the maritime carrier for transport
through the transit zone.  Upon arrival at the port of entry in the destination country,
the process is reversed.  The cargo passes through the custody of the port operator,
the customs authority, and possibly to customshouse brokers or de-consolidators to
the transport operator, and finally to the buyer.
It is important to note that there are in reality two sets of actors involved:  those
who hold what could be termed as documentary custody, the people in the offices at
each of the places outlined in Figure 3 who handle the paperwork side of the
transaction; and those actors who have physical custody or are in physical proximity
to the cargo itself (the warehouse and dock workers, longshoremen and truck drivers,
etc.).  Each of these groups of people present different risks to the flow of cargo, and
require different policies to address these risks.
Source: CRS analysis of OECD figures in Security in Maritime Transport.
Note:  FPOE = foreign port of exit, and DPOE = domestic port of entry, NVOCC = non-vessel
operating common carrier.
Movement of information or documents.  People — Individuals traveling
to the United States require a series of documents in order to arrive in the country
legally.  Figure 4 illustrates the movement of people from the source zone to the
destination zone.  Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States
who wish to come to the United States generally are required to obtain a visa to be
admitted. Foreign nationals from a Visa Waiver country who seek temporary
admission into the United States for business or pleasure do not need a visa,
however, such foreign nationals are required to possess a passport.11  As now
required by law, all travel documents must include biometric identifiers.  However,
there is concern that the lag in time before full implementation of the biometric
requirement could pose opportunities for terrorists.12
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by a Visa Waiver country must use biometric identifiers.  














Figure 4. Movement of People
Source: CRS.
Note:  FPOE = foreign port of exit, and DPOE = domestic port of entry.
Prior to obtaining a visa, all aliens must undergo admissibility reviews
performed by State Department  consular officers abroad.  Once they have been
issued a visa and prior to their admission to the United States, all aliens must submit
to an inspection, which includes an admissibility review, at a U.S. port of entry.
These reviews are intended to ensure that they are not ineligible for visas or
admission under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).  
Goods — Just as with people who seek to enter the United States, goods
entering the country are also accompanied by a set of documents.  As noted above,
there are many stages and actors through which cargo can pass before arriving in the
United States.  The OECD notes that some imports can require as many as 40
separate documents in order to complete the journey from the point of origin in the
source zone to the destination.  Each time a shipment changes hands from person-to-
person or place-to-place (as illustrated by Figures 2 and 3) it requires
documentation.  The required documentation generally includes two primary sets:
commercial documents that move cargo from each private sector actor (carrier,
broker, freight forwarder, consolidator, driver etc.); and customs entry documents
which contain information that can be used both for security and commercial
compliance screenings.
Generally, goods cannot legally enter the commerce of the United States until
CBP has released them.  Importers or their agents (e.g., customs brokers) are required
to file entry documentation with CBP for each importation regardless of whether or
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not duty must be paid on the merchandise.  To expedite clearance of their goods,
importers often file documents electronically and pay the bonds before the
merchandise arrives at the port of entry.  Entry documents include proper bills of
lading, entry forms, invoices, and evidence of the right to make entry.  Customs also
collects information from manifests for security purposes, including data about the
shipper, importer or consignee, and information concerning the nature of the
merchandise.  The data contained in these documents gives CBP necessary
information to target and screen high-risk shipments both for security and for
commercial entry purposes.  CBP inspectors examine goods for admissibility
(regarding any commercial or compliance issues) before releasing them into
commerce.  Goods are also inspected for security purposes including terrorist
weapons; illegal narcotics; and other contraband.
Figure 5 integrates the information contained in the previous figures (bearing
in mind that at the land borders, the transit zone is eliminated).  Figure 5 also
illustrates the path that visitors requiring a visa to enter the country take:  from the
U.S. Embassy abroad, through the FPOE, perhaps to a transit port, and finally to the
DPOE.  It shows  all of the different people, places, and zones through which cargo
or individuals can pass en route to the United States from a foreign country.
In addition to the points of vulnerability discussed above, the OECD highlighted
a series of related risk considerations relative to ocean-borne cargo shipping.13  These
factors include risks that arise from:  the cargo itself; the vessels carrying the cargo;
the people associated with the cargo and the vessels; and the money involved in
shipping activities.  This set of risk factors is also adaptable to other modes of
transportation, including planes, trucks, rail cars, etc.  Cargo shipments present a risk
in that they can be used to smuggle weapons (conventional, chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons), other types of contraband, or people (as in
immigrant smuggling in vessel containers, potential terrorists, etc.).  This risk is
possible not only for vessel-borne containers, but also for containers transported by
plane, truck containers, or even rail cars.  The vessel, or conveyance itself, presents
several risks in that it could (1)  be a target itself, (2) be used to launch an attack, or
(3) be used as a weapon (as in the case of the 9/11 attacks).  People present a risk
factor in that terrorists could attempt to gain access to a conveyance by, for example
joining a vessel crew, working at a dock or port, or by traveling as a passenger.  The
money risk factor lies outside the scope of this report.
It is important to note that border management is not necessarily a zero-sum
game.  Policies designed to increase the security of cross-border traffic need not
result in delays and inefficiencies at the border.  Border processes and policies are
usually judged for their efficacy in advancing the twin goals of expediting legitimate
traffic and impeding illegitimate traffic.
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Figure 5. Movement of Goods and People 
Source: CRS and CRS analysis of OECD figures in Security in Maritime Transport.
Note:  FPOE = foreign port of exit, and DPOE = domestic port of entry.
Legitimate and Illegitimate Cross-border Traffic 
Primarily, this report has built one possible typology based upon legitimate
flows of people and cargo across the border.  Though running as an undercurrent
throughout the report, it is important to explicitly acknowledge the illegitimate flows
of people and contraband that enter the country.  Smuggling takes many forms and
involves many types of commodities, from cigarettes to drugs to weapons to people.
Two primary issues of concern to federal law enforcement that are increasingly
discussed in testimony at congressional hearings are:  the potential interchangeability
of smuggling networks; and their possible nexus with terrorist networks.14  The same
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Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Hearing
on Homeland Security Departments Counternarcotics Mission, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., July
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and Victim’s Rights, Hearing on Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., July 23, 2003; U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on U.S.-
Mexico Relations,108th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 23, 2004.
groups that smuggle cigarettes across the border today may smuggle drugs or
weapons across tomorrow.  The same group providing fraudulent  documentation to
illegal immigrants today, might be doing business with terrorists tomorrow.  The
concern is that these groups are becoming more sophisticated; more flexible; and
increasingly willing to specialize.  For example, one could envision a
‘transportation’ network, with no real ties to the exporting or importing criminal
group.  This transportation network might be contracted on a shipment-by- shipment
basis to transport (smuggle) goods or people into the country.  Criminals and
terrorists can and do manipulate and interfere with legitimate cargo to smuggle
people and contraband into the country.  They also bypass the legitimate processes
and ports altogether, bringing their goods across between ports of entry.
The illegal flows of cargo could have a very different pattern than the ones
discussed in this report.  On the other hand, they could deviate at certain points, and
become parallel again at others.  This report has provided a series of graphical
representations to assist in developing a general understanding of the flow of goods
and people across the border as it applies to both legal and illegal crossings.
Conclusion
Achieving adequate BTS is an extremely complex task.  The conceptual
frameworks outlined in this report are meant to assist the policy maker in
understanding the legitimate flows of people and goods entering the country.  As
acknowledged earlier in the report, legitimate flows are but part of the picture:
criminals and terrorists can and do manipulate and interfere with legitimate cargo to
smuggle people and contraband into the country.  They also  bypass the legitimate
processes and ports altogether, bringing their goods across between ports of entry.
Understanding the flow of people and goods into the United States is a first step to
assessing current efforts, and developing new options and next steps.
As noted earlier, this report is the first in a series of three reports addressing the
issue of BTS.  The second report in the series (CRS RL32840, Border and
Transportation Security:  Selected Programs and Policies) discusses selected current
policies and programs in operation to improve at least some aspect of BTS.  These
policies are grouped in a framework that suggests types of possible policy actions:
! pushing the border outwards to intercept unwanted people or goods
before they reach the United States;
! hardening the border through the use of technology and the presence
of more agents at the border;
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! making the border more accessible for legitimate trade and travel;
! strengthening the border through more effective use of intelligence;
and
! multiplying effectiveness through the engagement of other actors in
the enforcement effort (including engaging Canada, Mexico, state
and local law enforcement resources, and the private sector).
Security of people and cargo destined for the United States requires a complex
set of policies that engage actors from each of the geographic zones (foreign
governments, private sector actors, and other U.S. government agencies).  These
relationships and policies must also take into consideration requirements unique to
the different modes of transportation (air, vessel, truck, and rail).  Policies could, for
example, encompass the entire journey from the source zone to the destination zone;
or policies could focus distinctly on a particular zone/place/actor in the journey.  Or,
a layered approach may be employed that involves nearly all of the constructs
identified in Figure 5 (viz., people, conveyances, cargo, places, routes, etc.).  The
transit zone in the maritime environment poses a unique challenge for cargo security.
This is because there is no single governing body responsible for regulating the zone.
Organizations like the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) have adopted measures and are working towards
developing strategies to harmonize customs procedures and increase maritime
security, but the standards and conventions  developed by these institutions must be
adopted by individual governments for them to have any real authority.
The third report in the series, CRS Report RL32841, Border and Transportation
Security: Possible New Directions and Policy Options builds on the first two reports,
and offers possible new directions and policy options that spring directly from the
analytical frameworks contained within those reports
